Showing posts with label Case Analysis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Case Analysis. Show all posts

Citation- AIR 1987 P&H 90

Case no- civil regular first appeal no. 1205 of 1984 decided on September 5, 1986

Court Jurisdiction- Punjab and Haryana high court

Judgment delivered by- Justice J.V. Gupta

Judgment- India

FACTS

In this case, the plaintiff, Batala branch of the new bank of India filed a case against the defendant for the recovery of the amount of Rs. 687908.86. The allegation was that the defendant S.K. Engineering works had been dealing with them as a partnership firm. The plaintiff agreed to give a loan to the defendants of Rs. 3,50,000 as per C.C hypothecation and also granted Rs. 30000 as per B.P. limit. On 21st August 1976, they enforced a promissory note which held them severally and jointly liable for the payment of the loan extended to them by the plaintiff bank. The plaintiff bank charged a rate of 6.5% above that of the RBI which was a minimum of 15.5%.

With the term loan against Rs 150000, the defendants drew a promissory note along with the hypothecation deed and receipt of waiver and general lien agreement. On 21st August 1976 the plaintiff initiated the cash credit hypothecation in the name of the defendant and on the account of stamp paper, it showed a debt of Rs 225000. This account was operating until the date of the suit as of 18th February 1892. In this account, it was alleged that the plaintiff bank was supposed to get a sum of Rs. 5,62,768.85 as of 15th February 1982. Against the term loan, a sum of Rs 1,25,040.01 was to be recoverable against the defendants. On 11th October 1976, one of the defendants in the partnership mortgaged in respect of land, factory, building, and one Ahata and also deposited title deeds with the plaintiff bank.

It was pleaded by the defendants that they shall pay off against the two accounts by delivering and signing on the balanced amounts on different dates as mentioned in the facts above. They had also decided to pay off the term loan by depositing quarterly interest of Rs 12,500. Despite the continuous demands by the plaintiff bank, they failed to clear the loans.

The defendants also pleaded that this suit was liable to be dismissed as the details of pledged property were not specified and also contended that their signatures were obtained by the plaintiff bank on white and they were not made aware of the contents of the documents and they denied the execution of the agreement.


ISSUES

1.     Whether the goods pledged can be retained as collateral security if the amount is not paid at the stipulated time as per section 176 of the Indian contract act 1872?

2.     whether the bank can retain the property not only for the principal amount but also for the interest accumulated on debt as per sec 173 of the Indian contract act 1872?

3.     Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the amount mentioned in the suit and is entitled to the future interest at contractual rates?

4.     Whether the C.C hypothecation and lien agreement gives the plaintiff bank direct right to seize the goods under section 176 of the Indian contract act 1872? 

RULES

Sec 176 of ICA 1872 defines the Pawnee’s right whenever the pawnor makes any default. This section distinctively defines two rights of pledgee-

1.     The pledgee can sue the pawnor if he makes any default on the payment and can retain the goods as collateral security.

2.     He is entitled to sell the goods after giving reasonable notice to the pawnor. [1]

In the present case, this section is closely interlinked with section 173 where the pawnee can retain the goods not only for the payment of the principal amount but also for the interest of the debt and all the other expenses incurred by him to maintain the goods pledged[2].

The rule in the third issue is shortly defined in section 34 of the code of civil procedure act 1976 which defines the rate of interest arising out of a commercial transaction may exceed six percent but it shall not exceed the rate of interest mentioned in the contract. And where the rate of interest is unspecified, it shall align with the norms of nationalized banks.[3]

ANALYSIS

Under sec 176 of the Indian contract act, the pledgee can hold the goods as collateral security until the amount of debt is realized. Although when the amount is realized, the pledgee will have to redeliver the goods to the pawnor. However, if the pledgee is not able to return the goods, he will not be entitled to the payment of the loan. In this section it is also mentioned if the amount from the sale is less than the amount of debt, the pawnor is supposed to pay the remaining amount. However, if the amount from the sale is more than the debt, the pawnee shall pay the surplus amount to the pawnor[4].

In the present case, the rulings of the famous Lallan prasad case can be incorporated where it was decided the court that the pawner’s right to recover the goods is extinguished once the sale of goods takes place but the pawnee was bound to return the sale proceeds and pay the surplus amount. [5]. However if the debt is realized on the stipulated time, he can recover his goods back. Thus it was held in the present case that the right to sue on the debt will mean that he is ready to deliver the goods back once the payment is made and if he is not able to deliver the goods back to the pawnor, he cannot obtain the court order to sell pledged property.However, in the present case, the learned counsel did not support the contentions of the Lalan prasad case when it came to paying the future interest at contractual rates as the property was still in possession of the plaintiff but later it was overruled by the high court. [6]

Another landmark case ofHindustan Development Corporation vs Modiluft ltd [7]where shares were pledged with the bank and the defendants failed to pay the amount it was held that the bank had the right to dispose of them and the company was directed to transfer the title.

The final judgment of the trial court was modified by the high court and acting in consonance it was held that the defendants are bound to pay the aforesaid amount within three months failing to which their pledged property shall be sold and in case of deficiency from the sale proceeds, the defendants shall be personally liable to pay the amount.

As against the second issue it was held that the plaintiff is entitled to the amount along with the future rate of interest at the contractual rates as agreed between the parties under section 173 of the Indian contract act 1872 and the property retained is not only for the payment of principal amount but also for the payment of interest on the debt.

As against the third issue, the plaintiff was allowed the sum of Rs 687808.86 along with the cost as per future interest on contractual rates on the amount from 18th February 1982 till the amount is realized.

As against the fourth issue, a loan is secured by the hypothecation under which the immovable property is given as collateral security, and the title is not transferred. The owners of the pledged property are under an obligation to discharge the loan and if they fail to do so, it can be recovered by selling the pledged property.

In this case, the defendant pledged the immovable properties as per the CC hypothecation agreement due to which the plaintiff bank does not have the right to directly seize the pledged property, they have to either give reasonable notice or obtain a court decree to sell the property as directed under section 176.

CONCLUSION

Thus, following the locution of section 176, it was decided that the plaintiff bank is entitled to sell the pledged property if the defendants fail to pay the amount within three months and If the amount obtained from the sale is less debt plus the interest rates, the defendants shall redeem the balance amount. There were entitled to the amount of Rs. 687808.86 along with the future interest at contractual rates.

The main aim of sec 176 is to mitigate the creditor’s risk if the debtor defaults on the payment he can sell the property and would be able to compensate for the deficiency of cash inflows. This section secures commercial transactions in the contemporary world. The contract act defines the pledges of bailment in a very substantiative manner thus enhancing the security of every commercial transaction.


AUTHORED BY: SHUBHRA GOYAL

[2]Indian contract act 1872 sec 173 No. 9 Acts of parliament 1872 (India)

[3]Code of civil procedure act 1976, sec 34

[4]Business laws by Avtar singh (11th edition) pg cited 176-177

[5]Lallan Prasad vs Rahmat Ali, AIR 1967 SC 1322

[6]S.K. Engineering Works vs. New Bank of India, AIR 1987 P&H 90

[7]Hindustan Development Corporation vs Modiluft ltd, (2005) 4 CHN 14 (Cal) 

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The Supreme Court of India examined recent changes in arbitration law before making its historic decision in the case Amazon v. Future Coupons. A dispute about whether or not emergency arbitration may be legally binding was brought before the supreme court. The conflicting views that the parties had on whether or not it was acceptable under Indian law was considered by the highest court to be a significant legal matter. This article provides an explanation of the ramifications of the ruling as well as the factual basis upon which the case was built.

 

The significance of this case may be attributed to a few different factors. In the first place, it contributes to the sizeable body of Indian case law that already exists to explain commercial arbitration. In addition to this, it investigates an aspect of arbitration that is relatively recent and has received a less amount of research in comparison to previously decided cases. Thirdly, it demonstrates how India's objective of restricting court intervention in arbitration procedures is mirrored in the judgment, which gives security and confidence to international investors.

 

Facts of the case

 

Amazon (Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC) and The Future group reached many settlements about this dispute (Future Retail Ltd -FRL and Future Coupons Private Ltd -FCPL). Amazon was given sole ownership of the retail premises under these arrangements, and Future Group was obligated to get Amazon's written approval before to selling those assets. The agreements forbade Future Group from allowing "restricted parties" access to its retail locations. With retaliation, the "restricted person" Reliance Industries Group signed a contract with the Future Group in the hope of merging with another company and taking over control of the retail assets. An arbitration battle resulted from this unique transfer between Amazon and Future Group.

 

Amazon has taken Future Group to arbitration under the terms of the arbitration clause in their contract, using the SIAC Rules (Rules of Singapore International Arbitration Centre).Further is was decided that the arbitration will be held on October 25, 2002 in New Delhi, India, an expedited arbitration granted Amazon temporary relief. Following Future Group's refusal to implement the emergency judgement, Amazon filed a suit with the Delhi High Court requesting that the emergency award be made legally binding. After hearing an appeal of the case, the Supreme Court rendered a decision on the aforementioned points.

 

Important matters before the Supreme Court.

 

Numerous problems were raised by the SC, but the following stand out:

 

1.      Is an Emergency Arbitrator an arbitrator for the purposes of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, and what constitutes a "award" rendered by an Emergency Arbitrator appointed in accordance with an order made in accordance with Section 17(1) of the Act?

2.     2. Is it possible to appeal a decision that was made by a High Court Single Judge who was aware of the application of an Emergency Arbitrator's decision in accordance with Section 17(2) of the Act?

 

Supreme court decision in a case

 

"The Arbitration and Conciliation Act makes no mention of "Emergency Arbitrator" or "Emergency award" (A&C Act).The Court did point out that each party is allowed to choose its own set of institutional rules for arbitration procedures, however. This indicates that any clause in the rules that the parties have agreed to for emergency arbitration may be used. The A&C Act's following provisions illustrate this:

 

·       Disagreements between the parties may be resolved by a selected institution in accordance with Section 2(6).

·       Section 2(8) - The parties may choose the applicable arbitration rules.

·       They may also decide on the strategy the tribunal will use to conduct its business in accordance with Section 19 (2).

 

The Supreme Court concluded that this was done principally to safeguard party autonomy during the arbitration in light of the aforementioned clauses. It was also highlighted that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act does not include any limitations that would prevent the appointment of an emergency arbitrator or the carrying out of temporary relief procedures in accordance with institutional standards.

 

The inclusion or exclusion of an emergency arbitrator from the definition of the arbitral panel was the second essential consideration to take into account. However, according to a literal reading of Section 2(1)(d) of the A&C Act, an emergency arbitrator is not included in the definition of "arbitral tribunal." The term "arbitral tribunal" may refer to either a single arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators.Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled that this Article is applicable to emergency arbitration as well, expanding its scope of applicability. When interpreting Section 2(1)(a), which allows "any" arbitration, the Supreme Court relied on the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" to clarify that an emergency arbitrator's interim award would be subject to the orders of the "arbitral tribunal". The phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" was included in the section. The document proceeded by declaring that emergency arbitrators and arbitral tribunals had similar legal standing and had the possibility of having their rulings supported by the supreme court.

 

Impact on the law of arbitration

 

Due to the decision, the Supreme Court confirmed "party autonomy" as the fundamental premise of arbitration and referred to it as the "guiding principle" in all circumstances. An emergency arbitration is one of the incontestable possibilities that arbitration provides parties.

 

The overwhelming number of cases that are now pending in the courts has often drawn the attention of the Supreme Court. An emergency award in this situation is meant to provide the parties quick assistance while lowering the number of cases in the judicial system.

 

India increases support for arbitration and establishes itself as a centre for the settlement of international disputes by adopting the concepts of contemporary arbitral law. India must explicitly include a clause for emergency arbitration in the Act itself if it hopes to become a global leader in arbitration. India will gain a lot from this in terms of its ability to arbitrate.

 

Additionally, while deciding on interim remedies, courts are required to adhere to a set of rules. The emergency arbitrator is expected to respect the same norms of secrecy and procedural efficiency as every other arbitrator.

 

It is still up for debate how an emergency judgment in an arbitration with a foreign seat is carried out. Indian courts are known to encourage an expeditious arbitral ruling. A court of case law in India has not yet rendered a decision on the topic of whether or not a judgment arrived at in the course of an emergency arbitration procedure held in another country is enforceable in India.It is common wisdom that when foreign parties enter into an arbitration agreement, they should choose India as the venue for the arbitration to ensure that Indian courts would not interfere with the legal implementation of an emergency arbitral verdict. This is because Indian courts have a history of doing so. This is done in order to comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement. We may presume that India will soon explain its stance on emergency arbitration in an ad hoc circumstance after this matter is resolved.


AUTHORED BY: SIDDHANT MANCHANDA


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Introduction

The case named Tukaram & Anr. v State of Maharashtra[1] was a landmark case as far as rape and its laws are concerned. The incident took place in 1972, Chandrapur district of Maharashtra which shook the nation. The decision was given by the Supreme Court was something that caused outrage within the nation. Several protests were organized by many activists such as Vasudha Dhagamwar (who submitted an open letter to the Chief Justice of India about this matter) and Upendra Baxi Raghunath Kelkar Lotika Sarkar) against the decision. Also it led to further introspection and lead to review of rape laws in India and the definition of consent was redefined.

Facts of the case

Mathura, a sixteen-year-old girl, who was an orphan who worked as a house help at the Nushi’s place. She was in love with Ashok, Nushi’s nephew. Also she developed sexual relations with him. She wanted to marry him, to which his brother objected. As a consequence of which he filed a kidnapping case against Ashok and Nushsi’s husband. The head Constable Baburao recorded the statement. Ashok as well his family was brought to Police Station. Approximately around 10:30 AM, everyone was heading out of police Stations post recording of their statements.

The accused Ganpat asked Mathura to stay while everyone was leaving the station. The accused turned the lights off, shut the door and allegedly raped her after asking to disrobe herself, thus outraging the modesty. After he was done, another accused Tukaram, who was heavily intoxicated, could not rape, but fondled with her private parts.

Mathura told her family and friends about the incident. Her hymen exhibited previous ruptures, but she had no other injuries on her body, according to the medical examination. She was between the ages of 14 and 16, and her hymen revealed old ruptures.

Issues

The Issue before the court was whether there was any activity of rape was committed by the accused?

Judgment

The case went through the due judicial process. The judgement given by the three courts i.e. sessions court, high court and supreme court. The sessions court went on to give an erroneous decision leading to acquittal of the accused. When the matter reached to Bombay high court, the decision given by sessions court was reversed and the accused were convicted. On further appeal to the apex court the court went on to give absurd decision which led to wide spread protest and eventually lead to necessary amendments in various legislations.

 

Session’s Court

Sessions court acquitting the accused said that the guilty was habituated to sex and her consent was obvious in order to satisfy Ganpat, one of the accused. According to them sexual intercourse did take place but it was not rape.

He referredto medical reports and concluded that there were no body marks on the body of the victim, thus use of any kind of force is automatically ruled out.

Also the medical reports mentioned that the girl is between 14-16 years of age, thus amounting to rape irrespective of consent[2]. But the judge went on to say that the evidence for the same is not sufficient.

Bombay High Court

Unlike the session’s court, the High Court held the accused guilty for rape. They were of the opinion that what happened over there was a passive submission. And the same cannot be correlated with consent.

Also, the fact that no resistance was shown by the girl cannot be concluded as consent. The policemen were obviously at a superior position, thus showing any kind of resistance to them would have been detrimental for her and her family.

According to the High Court, the girl's lack of semen on vaginal smears and pubic hair was due to the fact that she was checked twenty hoursafter the incident occurred and that she must have bathed at any point between the incident and the medical check-up.

The policemen were complete strangers to the girl. So it is highly unlikely she was consenting for the act by the policemen.

But High court did admit that the medical evidence produce is ‘weak evidence’ and it cannot be admissible.

Supreme Court

In 1979, the supreme Court gave its verdict and they overturned the High Court’s decision. The Apex Court had a similar view with that of Session’s Court. They were of the opinion that this is a case of consensual sex and the girl did consent for the same.

Also they didn’t find any injury marks on the victims’ body, thus there was no resistance from her side.

Aftermath of the Case

The judgement led to massive protests from the side of activists, lawyers etc. There felt was a need of strong and necessary amendments to the existing legislation that encapsulates all the necessary blunders from the side of Courts.

a) Medical Test: Medical evidence is admissible in court under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, which allows medical experts' opinions to be used in judicial procedures. The Supreme Court, however, determined that because this is a sort of 'opinion evidence,' it should be considered a 'poor type of evidence.' In criminal prosecutions, medical evidence has always been crucial. It tries to prove that either the accused was guilty of rape or that such evidence can be used to prove that the plaintiff's testimonial was forged, proving that the victim was a bad person[3]. As an outcome, the sentence of the offender is lowered. As a result, the Evidence Act's provision 155(4)[4] was revoked.

In Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa[5], the victim was referred to as a "concubine" since she was in a relationship with a married man and later wedded him in a bigamous marriage. Three men raped her when she was on a vacation with her husband. The court, however, acquitted all three on the grounds that the victim had no visible injuries and thus must have given her consent. Furthermore, throughout intercourse, she had just wept rather than yelled.The victim of gang rape miscarried after a few days, and the court stated that if the intercourse had been forced, she would have miscarried immediately rather than after a few days.

b) Testimony of the victim in the court: It is extremely difficult for the victim to establish the absence of consent, particularly in cases of incarcerated rape. The victim bears the burden of proof in proving that she was raped against her will. But then, under the Indian Evidence Act, Section 114A[6] was inserted, which provides that if victim denied the consent in any cases of rape, the court shall presume that she did not consent for the same and the burden of proof of will shift to the defendant[7].

The Supreme Court ignored the precedent set by Justice Krishna Iyer in Nandini Satpathy[8], in which he criticised the practise of summoning ladies to the police station and declared it a serious breach of Section 160(1)[9] of the CrPC.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that India's rape laws have been revised over time, the number of rape cases continues to rise year after year. This act not only causes significant bodily harm to the victim, but it also has catastrophic psychological consequences such as PTSD, depression, flashbacks, sleep difficulties, and more. Improving the protection and security of women in the state would be one step toward eliminating this crime. More than strict rules to punish wrongdoers, men's attitudes and mentalities, such as those of the Supreme Court Judges in the Mathura Rape Case, need to be changed.

AUTHORED BY: PUSHPAM JHA, STUDENT AT SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, NOIDA

[1]Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 143

[2]Section 375(6) Indian Penal Code, 1860 (act 45 of 1860)

[3]Samiksha Kandya, 'Sentencing in Rape Cases in India: An Analysis' (2021) 26 Supremo Amicus [411]

[4] Section 155 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (act 1 of 1872)

[5] Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa (1977) 3 S.C.C. 41

[6]Section 114A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (act 1 of 1872)

[7]Samiksha Kandya, 'Sentencing in Rape Cases in India: An Analysis' (2021) 26 Supremo Amicus [411]

[8] Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani and Anr., (1978) 2 SCC 424

[9]Section 160(1) od Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (act 2 of 1973)

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 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 251 OF 1982

DECIDED ON- 18.03.1982

CITATION: 1993 AIR 1608, SCR (2) 488

 

APPELLANT- D.S. DALAL

V.

RESPONDENT- STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS.

 

HON’BLE JUDGE:

- KULDIP SINGH

- N.M. KASLIWAL, JJ

Professional Misconduct by Advocates in India: A Critical Analysis By:  Trishala Singh[1]

 HISTORY OF CASE:

1.      D.S. Dalal was a practicing Advocate in Delhi.

2.      The Bar Council of India by its order dated October 24, 1981, removed his name from the rolls of Advocates of the Bar council of Delhi & the sanad granted to him has been withdrawn.

3.      The Appeal under section 30 of the Advocates Act, against the order of the Bar Council of India.

4.      The State Bank of India lodged a complaint before the Bar Council of Delhi on September, 4, 1998.

5.      The complaint that the appellant along with two other advocates was practicing under the name & style of “Ms. Singh and company”[2]

6.      A firm of Advocates & Solicitors having their office at 2610 Subzi Mandi, Delhi.

7.      It was alleged that the advocates were duly engaged by the Asaf Ali Road Branch of the State Bank of India to file a recovery suit against M/S Delhi Flooring (pvt) Ltd. For the recovery of Rs. 6, 12, 16,410.[3]

8.      “SINGH &COMPANY” the firm at that time was represented by MR. D.S. Dalal, Ms. V. Singh & Mr. B. Singh, Advocates who were the partners of the said firm and ere conducting cases for & on behalf of the firm.[4]

9.      It is the case of the complaint that in the year, 1995. 

10.  The file relating to the case which was to be filed against Ms. Delhi Flooring (pvt) Ltd.

11.  The file relating to the case original & valuable documents was handed over to the firm by the compliant. The firm submitted the professional fees & other miscellaneous charges.

12.  An amount of Rs. 11,495 was paid to the firm on November 15.1995.

13.  Till December 19, 1995 the firm did not inform the bank as to whether the suit was filed and if so what was the stage of the proceedings.

14.  The bank wrote a letter on December 5 1995 to the firm asking it to send a copy of the paint before December, 8, 1995. For signature and verification filing which the bank would be compelled to withdraw the case from the firm.

15.  At that stage Mr. B. Singh, Advocate in his letter December, 15, 1995 informed the bank the suit had been filed on Dec, 15 in the high Court Of Delhi. Thereafter the bank appears to have received no communication from the said above despite repeated reminders.

16.  As there was no response from the Appellant, the bank engaged the services of Mr. R.P. ARORA, Advocate, in order to find out as to what happened to the suit filed by the appellant on behalf of the bank.

17.  Mr. Arora informed the bank that the suit which been filed on Dec, 15, 1995 was returned by the original branch, the registry of the High Court with objection & thereafter the suit has not re- filled in the registry of the High Court. [5]

 

FACTS:

1.      In 1995, the bank engaged the firm to rile on recovery suit for the amount of Rs. 6,12,16, 410 from M/S Delhi Flooring (pvt) Ltd & handed over the case- rile containing ordinal &valuable documents.

2.      The firm submitted a bill fir celling the recovery suit which included the professional fees & other miscellaneous charges.

3.      On 15.11.1995 the bank paid a sum of Rs. 11,475 which included 1/3rd of the professional fee and the miscellaneous charges.[6]

4.      It did not inform the bank whether the suit was filed or not.

5.      On 5.12.1995 the bank wrote a letter to the firm to send a copy of the plaint before 8.12.1995 or the bank would be compelled to withdrawn the case from the firm.

6.      On 15.12.1995, one of the partners of the firm informed the bank the suit was filed on 15.12.1995 in the High Court.

7.      The bank engaged the service of one Mr. Arora, Advocate, in order to find out as to what happened to the suit.

8.      On 2 March, 1999 at the bank was informed by Mr. Arora, Advocate that suit was filed on 15.12.1995 in the High Court and on 31.1.1996, it was returned by the original branch to the registry with objections. Mr. Arora, Advocate further informed the bank on 31.3.1997 that the entire suit paper book was returned to Mr. Singh, Advocate of the firm on 29.9.1996 for removing the objections & thereafter the suit was not refilled. [7]

9.      The respondent bank thereafter, claimed before the Bar Council of Delhi that appellant & his associates misappropriated the money paid to them for court fee, miscellaneous expenses & one-third of the professional fee.

10.  The complainant further stated that, even the documents & other papers handed over to the appellant & his associates for filing the suit were not returned the complainant was originally registered with the Bar Council of Delhi .

11.  On September 19. 1999 the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Delhi transferred the case to the Bar Council of India on the ground that the case had been pending for more than one year.

12.  The Bar Council of India issues notices returnable on 2.11.1980. the appellant & his associates were not present on that date. Therefore fresh notices were issued for 20.12.1980, the appellant did not present on 20.12.1980 & ex-parte proceedings were ordered.

13.  On 23.1.1981 the appellant moved on appreciation for setting aside the ex-parte order dated 20.12.1980 which was allowed & the case was adjourned to 29.2.1981.

14.  The case was adjourned from time to time & finally fixed for evidence on 22.8.1981 on 22.8.1981, the appellant application for adjournment was rejected the evidence was concluded, arguments were heard & the order was reserved.

15.  The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India held that the case against the appellant & his associates was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Their names were removed from the rolls of Advocates of the Bar Council of Delhi & the sanands granted to them were ordered to be withdrawn.

INITIAL OF CASE:

1.      Initially the case was before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India.

2.      The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Delhi transferred the case of the Bar Council of India, as the case was pending for more than one year.

FINDING:

1.      Mr. R.P. Arora appeared as a witness before the Bar Council of India.

2.      Mr. R.P. Arora examined the records of Delhi High Court.

3.      Mr. R.P. Arora. Advocates, after examining the records of the Delhi High Court had send two reports to the State Bank of India.

4.      In this report dates March 2, 1999 he stated as under:-

i)                    “As desired by you, to know the where about of the above noted case, I contacted the concern clerk in the original Branch of High Court of Delhi at New Delhi & also inspected the register of the original suits.

ii)                  The above noted case was filed by M/S Singh & Company on 15.12.195 but there were certain objections by the original branch & on 31.1.1996 the said case file as returned to the registree by the original branch.

iii)                The register of the registree in respect of the period from 31.1.1996 is not available & I shall let you know the up to date information. When the said case was returned to M/S Singh & company within a short period.

5.       In this report dated March 31, 1999, Mr. R.P. Arora, Advocate gave the following information to the bank.

i)                    ‘I have enquired from the original section of High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, which the file of the above stated case was returned to Shri. B. Singh on 29.9.1996 as the said case was under objections. So far he has not again filed the said case in High Court.’

6.      Both the above quoted reports have been proved on the record of the Bar Council of India as evidence.

7.      The Bar Council of India on appreciation of the evidence before t came to the conclusion that the charge against the appellant & Mr. B. Singh was proved beyond doubt.

DECISION OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

1.      After having gone through the evidence & the document produced in the case carefully. We have come to the conclusion that the complainant had entrusted to suit to be filed against M/S Delhi Flooring (pvt) Ltd.

2.      The necessary papers & Rs. 11,495 for expenses etc., to the respondent, Advocate.

3.      It is also established that the respondents have filed the suit on 15.12.1995 with some objections deliberately & when the papers were returned by the High Court.

4.      They had not refined the suit for a pretty long time is established tiff this day.

5.      So. We have no hesitation to conclude that the respondents have misappropriated that amount realized by them.

6.      The bank without filing the suit in a proper manner.

7.      The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India held that the case against the appellant & his associates was proved beyond reasonable doubt, their names were removed from the rolls of Advocates of the Bar Council of Delhi & the sanad granted to them were ordered to be withdrawn.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

1.      Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with no cost.

 

PRINCIPLE OF THE COURT

1.      Under section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

2.      It was the professional misconduct.

3.      The suit has not been refilled in the Registry of the High Courts of Delhi.

       AUTHORED BY: ARUNDHATI SINGH


[1]https://www.google.com/search?q=DS+DALAL+V.+SBI&sxsrf=ALeKk02AGj-qXLCM3GIK3C1YoVEgxqSwNA:1626328485773&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiYpbrdseTxAhXezTgGHRfEDRYQ_AUoA3oECAEQBQ&biw=1366&bih=657#imgrc=46L_grWFX2v3zM

[2]https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f269 (last seen: 16/05/21)

[3] https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f269  (last seen: 16/05/21)

[4] https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f269 (last seen: 16/05/21)

[5] https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f269 (last seen: 16/05/21)

[6] https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f269 (last seen: 16/05/21)

[7] https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f269 (last seen: 16/05/21)